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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ll()l\ll£R \Y·. II~\XSOK and ·~\ 
BETH P. H.ANSOX, his wife, 
Plai11 t i If s-Rrs p011d ents, 
-vs.-
BEEHIVE N~~('1lTI~Irr\T CO~IP ANY, 
et al., 





BRIEF o~F AP·PELLANT 
ST.t\_TEl\lENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action to determine the validity and effect 
of a real estate mortgage entered into between \'Villard 
J. Stringer, \Tiola Stringer and Beehive Security 
Company. 
DISPOSlrriOX IX LOWER COURT 
This case is an appeal by the Defendant, BeehiYe 
SPrnrity Company, of the judg·ment entered .t\ pril 6, 
19(i~, in Civil X o. 13213~ of the District Court of Salt 
Lake County by J ndge Joseph G. Jeppson ·w·herein the 
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court decided that the mortgage entered into between 
Willard J. Stringer, Viola Stringer and Beehive Security 
Company was cancelled, annulled, rescinded and held 
for naught. 
STATEJ\IENT OF FACTS 
On August 1, 1961, the Respondents \vent to the office 
of Lothaire Rich, a real estate broker and lawyer, to 
make a real estate transaction. This transaction "Tas to 
be the exchange of Respondents' nine four-plexes and one 
home for a promissory note O\\rned by Bonneville Securi-
ties Corporation. According to the Earnest ~foney Re-
ceipt and conversation bet,veen the Respondents and 
Lothaire Rich, their lawyer ( TR-9), the Grantee in the 
conveyances was to be Bonneville Securities Corpora-
tion ( R-28). 
1\.lso present at lllr. Rich's office \vere Willard J. and 
Viola Stringer and Boyd Fullmer, the President of Bon-
neville Securities Corporation ( TR-5). Sometime prior 
to the actual closing of the transaction the question \vas 
asked \vhat ~fr. Stringer \vas doing there at that time 
(TR-21), and ~Ir. Rich in the presence of the Respondents 
said that l\fr. Stringer \Yas getting part of the property 
(TR-22). 
At the time the deeds "Tere ~ig-ned by the Respondents 
they 'vere a\\Tare that the name of the Grantee had not 
ben filled in ( R-29), ( TR-7), ( TR -~~2), and they "Tere also 
a\vare that part of the propt>rty \\'"as to go to the String-
ers (TR-22 also TR-59). Respondents told ~Ir. Rich to 
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fill the GranteP blank~ \Vith the name of Bonneville Se-
curities Corporation prior to the delivery of the deeds 
(R-29). \Vhe11 questioned as to the reason for the Grant-
ee's namP not being filled in, ~~ rs. Hansen replied: ''Be-
e a use \Ve had a \vhole buneh of big important men there, 
and they seemed to kno\v "That they \Vere doing'' ( TR-33). 
Her husband, Mr. Hanson, was at this time a licensed 
real estate salesman for Riddle, Inc. (TR-3, 4) and the 
O\vner of a substantial amount of property. 
Sometime after Respondents signed the deeds "Tith 
the Grantee left blank, the names of Willard J. and Viola 
Stringer were put in as Grantees of the property located 
in Davis County, State of Utah, and described as: 
(R-29) 
Beginning at the Southeast corner of Lot 60, 
l{IRKHA VEN SUBDIVISION, Plat D, a subdi-
vision of part of the Southwest Quarter of Section 
19, To,vnship 2 North, Range 1 East, Salt Lake 
Base and l\Ieridian; thence North 0°19' West 94.30 
feet; thence South 89°53' West 140 feet= thence 
South 0°19' East 96.58 feet; thence North 88°57' 
East 140 feet to the point of beginning. 
On August 2, 1961, Willard J. Stringer received a 
loan of $3,000.00 from Appellant, Beehive Security Com-
pany, on a promissory note secured by the above prop-
erty. At this time the deed "'as filled in 'vith "\Villard J. 
and Viola Stringer as Grantees, a.nd Beehive Security 
Company did not kno,,~ and had no reason to know that 
the deed was not valid and complete. 
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On August 4, 1961, the deed and mortgage \Yas sent 
to the County Recorder's Office of Salt Lake County for 
recording ( R-29). The recorder's office 'vould not record 
the deed and mortgage because the property \Vas located 
in Davis County. On August 7 at 11 :05 a.m. the deed and 
mortgage \vere recorded in Davis L1ounty. But prior to 
this, at 8:30 a.m. on August 7, 1961, a lis pendens \vas 
filed on this same property in Davis County. 
ARGl~~IE~T 
PoiNT I. 
"">\ GRANTOR WHO E~XTRl1STS A DEED, 
WITH THE GRANTEE LEFT BI_...:\~1( AFTER 
HE HAS SIGNED IT, TO I-IIS ... ~GENT WITH 
EXPRESS PROVISIOXS ~\ S TO HO\\T THE 
GRANTEE'S NAl\IE IS TO BE FILLED IN 
C.1\NNOT DECLARE S~\ID DEED VOID IX 
REGARD TO A BOXA FIDE PURCHASER 
BEC---~USE A DIFFEREXT GR~\XTEE TH~.\X 
THE ONE ..:\ UTHORIZED \Y" AS PUT IN THE 
DEED. 
The present case presents the classic example of t\\To 
innocent people suffering because of the \Yrongful act of 
a third person. In such cases the n1odern trend of the la\Y 
is to protect the person \Vho is not re~ponsible for allo\v-
ing the misdeed to take place, or better said to shift the 
loss for the \vrongful act to the person \\'"ho enabled the 
third person to canst) the loss. This line of reasoning is 
supported by Tiffany Real Property. 3rd Edition, Sec. 
969, which sta t<_>s : 
''In case a blank as to the name of the grantee 
is filled by a person "Tho has no authority for the 
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purpose, Pither oral or in \vriting, or it is filled in 
a manner ront rary to the directions of the grantor, 
thP conl·eyanee i~, it is agreed, inYalid as regards 
a person \\~ho is a'varc of the circumstances of the 
transaction. As regards an innocent grantee or 
purchaser, on the other hand, it might frequently 
be Ynlid, on the grounds of estoppel, provided he 
least pa~Ts Yalue. If the grantor chooses to plac.e 
in the hands of another person an instrument duly· 
signed and sealed byhim, but \Yhich i~ other,vise 
in an incomplete state, and such other exceeds his 
authority in making the instrument apparently 
complete, the grantor, and not an innocent pur-
chaser, should be the one to suffer on account 
thereof. The grantor should be estopped, in such 
case, to deny that the instrument is his art and 
deed.'' 
And in the 1960 Supplement to Thompson on Real Prop-
rrfy, Sec. 4232, this is stated more strongly: 
''One entrusting an incomplete instrument to 
\\Thich he has affixed his signature to another to be 
completed and delivered is bound to anyone \vho 
relies in good faith on the genuineness of such 
instrument, although the person entrusted has ex-
reeded his authority." 
This type of reasoning especially applies to the fact 
of this case. Here \\Te have sophisticated owners of nine 
d\\Telling units. One of the respondents is a registered 
real estate salesman (TR-3). They have an attorney act-
ing for them, and they knov,r the deeds \Yere left blank 
as to the grantee \vhen they signed them, but they tell 
their la"ryer to put the Bonneville Securities Corporation 
is as grantee before deli,Tery. The act of putting in this 
name \vould haYe taken only a fe\Y minutes. \Vlry, if it 
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was so important to them, the respondents did not put the 
name of the grantee in themselves, if they knew who the 
grantee was, we can only speculate about. Perhaps a fe",. 
minutes is an inordinate amount o{ time to spend in mak-
ing a transaction complete after \Vaiting in an attorney's 
office an entire afternoon ( TR-4). The point of the mat-
ter, however, is that the Respondents could have easily 
protected themselves. They kne\v 'vhom they ,,~anted to be 
grantees. Their action in entrusting the blank deeds to 
their agent after they were signed can only lead to the 
conclusion that they should suffer the loss of their o\vn 
impatience or negligence. They controlled the transac-
tion. The Appellant did not kno\v the grantee had been 
improperly filled in- nor did it have any cause to know 
that the instrument at one time was incomplete. The deed 
was complete and regular " .. hen the loan \vas made, and at 
the time it \Vas accepted as security for the loan there had 
been no lis pendens or notice given of any irregularity. 
Thus far in Utah the particular facts of this case 
have not been adjudicated. In Burnanz. et al L·s. Eschler, 
116 U. 61, 208 P. 2d 96 (1959) the question before the 
court involved the technical question of re-execution and 
re-acknowledgment if the grantee name "'"as filled in after 
the first signing of the deed by the grantor. Jn this case, 
the court referred to Beatty Y. Shelly, 42 U. 592, 132 P. 
1160, 1913 and also to Utah ~'-Jltate Bldg. & Loan v. Perkins, 
53 U. 47 4, 173 P. 950, 1918 for authority to the proposition 
that: 
" ... if the name of a grantee is inserted by a 
party \Vho never legally obtained possession of the 
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instrument nor ohtained authority from the grant-
or to complete the instrument no deed comes into 
existcnee. '' 
In the Bea.tty case the party relying on the blank deed 
'vrongfully o ht ained possession of it and placed his o,\·n 
name on it as grantee. He ncYer '\?as a bona fide pnr-
ehaser. The present case is entirely different in that the 
.-\ppellant \Vas a bona fide purchaser, and the deed 'Yas 
never \Vrongfully taken from the possession of the Re-
spondents. They gaYe it to Rich in order to consummate 
the transaetiou. In the Perkins case the person relying 
on the blank deeds was not a bona fide purchaser, but 
the very person who filled the deeds in. Also, the deed 
was illegally taken from the grantor. In the present 
ease both of these things are different. The Appellant is 
a bona fide purchaser, the deed 'vas rightfully put into 
its possession. 
Also in the Bea.tty case there is a general statement 
"rhich states : 
'' .L~dmi ttedly a paper purporting to be a deed, 
but ,\~hich is blank as to grantee, is no deed and is 
ineffective as a conveyance 'vhile the blank re-
mains. See cases collected at 32 ALR 737 and 173 
... \LR 1294.'' 
In the present case the deed 'Yas not blank at the 
time it "\Vas given to a bona fide purchaser, so that the 
general statement cited aboYe docs not apply. Ho"·eyer, 
in pursuing the g-eneral references in 32 ALR 7~17, the case 
of Guthrie v. Field, 85 Kan. 58, 116 P. 217, 37 LRA (:X.S.) 
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326, 1911 is cited by the annotator, and the case gives an 
excellent discussion of the better law in regard to a bona 
fide purchaser of a deed left blank as to the grantee: 
''Guthrie on the other hand, by intrusting Field 
\vith the blank deed, gave him the power to make 
a perfect record title in any one he might choose. 
Guthrie intended that Field should fill in and de-
liver the deed, but only upon certain conditions. 
Guthrie reposed confidence in Field that he "\\rould 
act in accordance with his instructions, kno"\\Ting 
that, if he did not, some innocent person might be 
misled. Field delivered the deed contrary to his 
instructions, and the consequence follo,ved that 
might have been anticipated if he 'vere to proYe 
unfaithful - a stranger to the transaction parted 
"\Yith his money having every reason to suppose 
he "\Yas obtaining a good title. Under these circum-
stances, the loss must fall upon Guthrie rather 
than upon Riffie ... 
'' ... One "\Yho arms another "rith such uncon-
trollable po,ver must kno"\\r that, if his chosen agent 
shall prove dishonest, that is likely to happen 
"\vhich in fact happened here, and if such result 
follows, it must be regarded as the consequence 
of his own imprudence. In acknowledging a blank 
conveyance before an offieer, a grantor in effect 
declares it to be a deed, "\Yhich it is not, so long as 
its terms are incomplete. Having purposely put 
forth his solemn declaration that he has signed 
the instrumPnt as a complete deed, "~hen he has 
not in fart done so (expecting the ru~todian to find 
a purchaser, fill in the blank, and effect a transfer 
of title), he is ans"\Yerable for thP consequences if 
another innocently suffers loss throug-h relying 
upon such assurance, and he rannot avail himself 
of the plea that n blank deed is no deed.'' 
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.-\lso in 175 AI.Jl~ 1300 there are a series of cases 
\Vhere the courts have held that the grantor cannot com-
plain after signing a deed in blank and then givi11g it to 
an agrnt to later fill in the blanks if the act \\·as improp-
erly done and the holder is no\v a bona fide purchaser. ThP 
court in Er!Jnonsou v. ll' aterstou, 342 .:\Io. 1082, 119 S\V2d 
318, 1938, states the reasoning excellently: 
''If plaintiff ( \vife) \Ycre permitted to have the 
deed set aside in this case, many titles to real es-
tate would be in a. precarious condition. No exami-
ner of an abstract \vould be safe in informing his 
r lient that he had good ti tie. The \\·idow of a 
grantor of the title could come into court and say: 
I signed the deed in blank; my husband asked me to 
do so because he "\Vas selling the property, but I 
never acknowledged the deed; the property "\vas 
sold to the \vrong party, and my husband sold it 
for more than the consideration mentioned in the 
deed. Such a rule would play havoc w·ith real-
estate titles. Under the authorities and established 
I a \V this cannot be done.'' 
It is true in these cases that the opportunity for 
trouble is enhanced because the grantor complaining is 
the \\·ife of the agent who exceeded his authority in filling 
in the blanks. But the reasoning is equally applicable to 
parties other than husband and \vife - and the possible 
damage to titles is just as great. 
The possible mischief that could be 'vrought to the 
titles \vi thin the State of Utah if the Respondents' con-
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PoiNT II. 
THE AUTHORITY OF AN AGENT TO EXE-
ECUTE A CONTRACT WITHIN THE STAT-
UTE OF FRAUDS FOR HIS PRINCIPAij 
NEED NOT BE IN WRITING. 
The problem of the agent's authority being in "\vriting 
to satisfy the Statute of Frauds has been considered in 
the case of Guthrie v. Field, supra, and decided that: 
'' ... the better rule is that authority may be given 
by parol to insert the name of a grantee in a deed, 
even after delivery.'' 
But there appears to be divided authority on this prob-
lem. In California., the cases of Upton v. Archer, 41 Cal. 
85, 1871, and Trout v. Taylor, 220 Cal. 652, 32 P. 2d 968, 
1934 hold that the authority of the agent must be in writ-
ing in order to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. In l:tah, 
ho,vever, the Supreme Court has held that absent a stat-
ute requiring that the agent's authority be in "\\'Titing a 
contract under the Statute of Frauds signed by an agent 
'vill not be void. See LeVine, et al. v. Whitelz ouse, et al., 
37 {;. 260, 109 Pac. 2, 1910. Section 25-5-9, lTCA 1!13:1. 
gives an agent authorit:T to sign for his principal to sat-
isfy the statute of frauds. No mention is made in the 
statute that his authority need be in "rriting. There ap-
pears to be no other reference to the need for the agent ·s 
authority to be in "~riting, so that the Lc T7.ine case still 
Pxpresses Utah la"'" on this subject. 
10 
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CONCI_.~USION 
In conclusion, Appellant respectfully submits that the 
mortgage on the contested property be held valid, and 
that the judgment of the lo\Yer eourt be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NIELSEN, CONDER AND HANSEN 
DEAN E. CoNnER 
510 Newhouse Building 
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